**UOb**

Well the background to what I have to say, as was mentioned, is the book that I wrote called ‘The Politics of Climate Change’, written basically over the years 2007, 2008, published in 2008. It’s quite a few years since then, although the book did have a subsequent edition in 2013. I thought a good way to structure this speech would just be to ask what has happened since then – where do we stand with our global attempts to curb climate change in the early part of the 21st century.

So if you go 7 or 8 years back it was actually quite an interesting time because it was a period at which there was a lot of hope around that the world might, as it were, get together and form, construct a concerted organised way of seeking to reduce the carbon emissions which are causing the earth’s climate to warm up. It was a time when Al Gore, the former Vice President of the United States, published his book and produced his movie, called ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, which actually resonated around the world, was watched by many millions of people in fact ... and he received a Nobel Prize for this endeavour. There’s actually quite a good story about that, quite a funny story about that, because not everyone in this audience will remember, but in the American election of 2000 Al Gore was lined up against George Bush. That election was very very close, Al Gore actually got more votes, more of the popular vote than George Bush did, and the election was settled by a very dubious set of things going on in Florida. And Al Gore could easily have been president of the United States, probably should have been president of the United States. You have to say if he had have been, the process of world history could have been very very different from how it turned out to be. And so even though he won the majority of the popular vote he never became president. And the story goes that ... this is sort of connected to the Nobel Prize ... and one of his assistants phones him up and says ‘Congratulations Al, you’ve got more votes from the jury to get the Nobel Prize than anyone else’ and Al Gore says ‘Well thank very much, who won?’ (laughter) But in that case he did win, and things kind of looked set fair because in 2009 there was the biggest meeting ever of the United Nations endeavour, the United Nations Organisation, to try to reach world agreements on how to limit carbon emissions.

It was a massive event in Copenhagen - about 115 world leaders came to that event. There was an enormous amount of hope around the world among climate change activists that it would produce some set of binding agreements among the nations of the world. President Obama turned up to these meetings, Hillary Clinton was at these meetings, most of the major world leaders were there. It was in Europe in Copenhagen, the EU saw itself as the leader in trying to develop active climate change policy. So there was tremendous hope among climate activists. As most people here will know unfortunately the Copenhagen meetings turned out to be not just a shambles but a fiasco. No agreement was reached, the various groups of countries involved including the developed versus the developing countries squabbled endlessly - it looked as though the whole thing was going nowhere. Then at the last minute a small group of states (?4:41) leaders got together and drew up a very short document, set of agreements, between basically the United States and what used to be called the ‘BRIC’ countries – Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and China ... and this was the sole outcome of the Copenhagen meetings. Interesting, the EU which saw itself as a leader, and it was in Europe obviously, was completely sidelined – it played no role at all in this agreement. The Copenhagen Accord in fact lasted very little time, it had very little impact of an enduring kind on global emissions. So all these hopes which were vested in this particular occasion, this time, I think not only came to nought, the situation was actively worse afterwards, precisely because so much emotional effort globally had been invested in them.

So what has happened over the past 6 or 7 years since then? Well if you look at the science itself, the advance of the science of climatology, the science of climate change, our knowledge about the fact that it is largely humanly induced over the past century, our knowledge about what its likely consequences will be ... over that period the science has become much more robust, much more robust. The latest studies from NASA, the American space organisation, which I think is the best monitoring organisation for monitoring the level of CO2 and other greenhouses gases in the atmosphere, the latest data from NASA, which came out very recently, shows that 2014 – the past year – was the warmest year globally since records began in 1880 ... with the exception of 1998, which was a very particular year because of things going on in the earth’s atmosphere. Apart from 1998, the 10 warmest years in recorded history have all occurred since the year 2000. There is no way of saying this is simply an anomaly, and the science has hardened very considerably. It’s very important to recognise ... I don’t know what the interests of everyone here tonight are, but it’s very important to recognise that our means of measuring the advance of humanly induced climate change are many – there is not just a single measure ... for example the warming up of the atmosphere is the most often quoted, but NASA gives about 20 different measures of the warming of the world’s climate. They include satellite measurements from inner space, satellite measurements from further out in space, the melting of the glaciers across the world, what’s happening in the arctic particularly, the warming of the oceans, the acidifying of the oceans – there is the long list ... the science behind these is very firm. So you certainly can conclude that our advance in our understanding of what’s happening to the world climate and the origins of these events has really advanced quite massively over that 7 or 8 years.

A few other things should be said about it, especially for people here who might not be that familiar with what climate change means and why it’s dangerous for our world. The advance of climate change produces more and more extreme weather events across the world. These include weather events of all types – greater aridity in some areas. For example my brother lives in California, they’ve now had 5 years of extreme drought in California. There’s actually only one year’s worth of water left in California, so the whole state is facing a massive water shortage, not simply due to climate change but almost certainly influenced by climate change. You look in Australia, you look in Latin America and Brazil – very large and sustained drought. You can never prove conclusively whether any particular weather event is the result of climate change. But when you look at the statistics of extreme weather events – very difficult to resist the conclusion that they are becoming more frequent and more radical across the world.

A crucial thing to recognise about climate change is that so far as we know it is irreversible. So for example I might say well global poverty is terrible, and indeed it is – global inequality – and it would still be terrible if you hadn’t done anything about it by 2050. Right? But nevertheless we still could do something about it in 2050 if we didn’t before. In the case of climate change this will not be possible short of some technological innovation which no one can anticipate, because we know of no way of getting the greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere once they’re there. Climate change seems to be irrevocable. It’s really important to register this because we’re talking about the fate of the earth, we’re talking about each of your individual lives, and we’re talking about the fate of industrial civilisation as it expands across the face of the earth - there doesn’t seem to be any way back. Therefore we have a relatively limited time space in order to seek to contain or reverse the issue. Interestingly there are different views of what climate change is kind of doing to the world. There may be some members of the Green movement in this audience, I hope so ... the Green movement tends to see the earth as fragile, and human activities as damaging a fragile ecosphere of the globe on which we live. And no doubt there are some elements of that ... though I’d like to say to everyone in the audience there is a much more frightening version of what we’re doing to the earth and that, and this is held by many scientists – this is that the earth is a bit like a wild beast and we are busy prodding that wild beast with sticks, and it will react violently to us. It’s a much more disturbing view of the implications of climate change than even the view of straightforward ecological damage.

And when you think about weather patterns and what they can do to our lives, I would like everyone in the audience to register the sheer power of nature. Everyone will have seen in the newspapers the last few days the cyclone in Vanuatu in the southwest Pacific where there were winds of ... according to some claims, well over 200 miles per hour, where the whole island was flattened, where quite a few people have been killed - that’s an example of the power of nature. And I think anyone who has a reasonably cautious view of the future would want to say we tamper with such powers at our ... there are huge dangers to us if such is the case for the make-up of the world. And I find that case, having looked at it, as much as a non scientist can, pretty persuasive. We’re busy tampering with a kind of forces which we have no real way of controlling and unleashing them. Not just on future generations, I shall argue, but also to some extent this is already happening in the here and now. And again I’d ask you to recognise that there is no parallel to humanly induced climate change in any previous civilisation. No previous civilisation has intervened in nature to ... even remotely, even remotely, to the degree to which we do on an everyday basis. You could say if you like ... and some geologists do say this – nature is no longer nature because it is so thoroughly infused with human intervention and human activity. To me it’s an awesome thought to think that we are intervening in nature and changing its own nature, its own character ... and almost certainly on a permanent irreversible basis. I hope that will give people at least a sense of the forces which globally we are toying with in the 21st century.

So at the same time as the science has become more robust, at the same time as the risks have become clearer, when you look at public opinion you face a really interesting differential, really interesting contrast, because although the science has become much firmer over the past 7 or 8 years, public opinion in quite a few of the industrial countries has become weaker in terms of people’s views, in surveys, of how dangerous they think climate change is, whether they think actions should be taken in the relatively near future to contain it ... it’s moved if you like in the opposite direction to the core of the scientific findings, which I would insist are very robust. If you were going into hospital, if you’ve got cancer ... God forbid anyone in this room does ... you could of course go and see a quack doctor or try lifestyle changes to control it, but you’d be much more sensible to go to a hospital and trust science. The same thing applies to climate change, where you have so many findings produced by the global scientific community under so much pressure from some kinds of critics from the outside, that we can be very confident that the dangers are real. What we don’t know ... there are uncertainties ... and that’s the level of danger that climate change poses to us. And if you look at the findings of the United Nations Organisation, international panel on climate change that gets together scientific findings every few years, it has different scenarios - there are some scenarios where the impact of climate change might be relatively limited.

However, uncertainty – really important to emphasise this – cuts both ways. The impact of climate change might be greater – it might be more dangerous than the majority of the scientific community believes. And I suppose again having been through all this material admittedly only as a non scientist can do ... cos most people in this room will be in the same position I think ... I’ve come to the conclusion that those who say that the level of risk at the top end is much more dangerous than the orthodox community of scientists says are probably right. In other words science is largely a conservative enterprise almost by definition, and the risks may be greater than the orthodox scientific community says, not less. I would stress strongly that we are dealing with risk here. You have to cover however all kinds of risk - you could not go with the world’s future just by saying there’s like a 15% chance that global warming would be limited let’s say to an average of 1.5 degrees, because it’s just as possible it could be up to 6 degrees, which would probably destroy much of our civilisation on the face of this planet. So you have to cover worst case risks, you cannot simply think them away. Therefore we must have concrete policies to deal with this issue, otherwise serious serious problems loom ... and in my view as I say are looming already.

Now why should there be this amazing contradiction between the robust nature of the science and the findings about public opinion, at least in quite a few industrial countries? I think it’s very necessary to register why this is so, and I’ll just mention quickly three or four reasons why. First are going to be like the Queen kind of descending marble steps ... can you all see me here, is that okay? It’s much nicer for me to be closer to the audience ... these are the reasons why public opinion tends to be so intractable about climate change ... let me list them quickly. First, as everybody knows, there are quite powerful interests involved. Especially among some of the fossil fuel companies and other interested parties who have actively deployed disinformation ... at least in some countries ... to try to mute public awareness of risk. It’s quite an interesting similarity between climate change in this sense and smoking where there was a long term attempt by the industry to cover up the consequences of smoking. So that’s one thing. The second ... more important I think ... is that the findings of the dangers of climate change are filtered through science. They’re filtered through the findings of something like 10,000 climatologists across the world. Well as I said, I’m not a scientist, most people here no doubt are not scientists ... if they are, they’re probably not climatologists. There’s never been an issue before where science has this pivotal political and consequential role in the determination of risk in this way. And it’s very important for public opinion because ... I mean I’ve done my best as someone studying the policies of climate change to master as much as I can of the science of climatology that’s relevant, but I’m never going to be a professional climatologist. For most of the lay public are much much more remote from the findings of climatology and science, so how are they going to form and informed opinion? It is a real issue and many dissenting voices are of course raised. Third, there’s a very important free rider problem, as they call it in political science, with climate change ... which you often get if you ever go in a cab in London, which I have to admit I don’t very much, but if you have a conversation with a cab driver, he might say or she might say ‘Oh well Britain only contributes less than 2% total global emissions, why should we be in any sense the leader?’ - so essentially the free rider argument. Of course every nation could make that claim ‘We won’t do it until the other nations do it’ – and that’s essentially what happened at Copenhagen when they couldn’t reach agreement. Free rider issue is a big issue for the collective politics of climate change and we have no easy way of overcoming it. Fourthly another reason for the collapse of Copenhagen is that there are real issues around economic development. It’s the rich countries who have put most of the emissions in the atmosphere. Everyone I think should concede that poor countries should have the chance to get rich, that India and China must have the chance to develop, that the African countries must have the chance to develop. You cannot just have the rich part of the world saying we’re going to close off the avenues of development which we used to get wealthy.

So there are huge issues around development. And they tend to have paralysed the UN meetings in the past in trying to reach agreement. Cos the developing countries or the emerging economies simply are not prepared to give up on the importance of their own economic development, and I have to say that I agree with them. However, in my view ... it’s what I argued in my book and it’s what I would still argue today ... the prime reason for the dislocation between public interests and involvement and the science of climate change is none of these things. It is I think, and still is, what I argued 7 or 8 years ago ... what somewhat presumptuously in my book I called Giddens’ Paradox ... Giddens’ Paradox is to do with the fact that I mentioned earlier that no one has ever had to confront the problem of climate change, humanly induced climate change, ever before. Therefore it’s very hard for people to give reality to it – you cannot calculate the precise nature of risk, and it’s so easy to say well what can I do about it, or maybe it’s not the case, or ... many other rationalisations you can use. In traditional risk situations every time you step into a car I can tell you unfortunately what your chances are of being involved in an accident. With climate change you can’t do that – there’s no way of doing so because you don’t have past experience to draw on. It therefore has this all too late quality. It’s a bit like nuclear weapons, we’ll only know what the situation really is when it’s too late. And I think the fact that climate change seems so remote to people that we have no experience of it, you cannot calculate the true level of risk – this is where the real difficulty of the politics of climate change lies. But if you put them all together you can see that it is a huge set of issues for us as individuals, us as cities, us as nations, us as a global community to overcome, and it’s very easy just to seek a rationalisation. Just like you might do if you’re a smoker, if you’re a smoker and you’re likely to say ‘Well I’m 18, I’m never going to be 40, it’s too far off I can’t think of that’ or ‘Someone will discover a cure for lung cancer before I’m 40’ or ‘My granddad smoked 100 cigarettes a day, and look he lived until he was 95’ - as though that’s got to anything to do with it - very easy to make these rationalisations, especially when you’re dealing with a partly unknown future. So the question of creating an adequate politics of climate change is pretty huge, but I do want to say to you that I think we will only resolve ... if we can .. contain climate change ... politics is going to have to be a pretty huge part of it. Technology may play a role, but without a pretty strong political involvement ... and that to some extent has to be a global political involvement ... we really don’t have much chance of containing what I think are hugely damaging forces ... especially at the upper end of the risk scenarios, as I mentioned.

Well it’s 2015, it’s kind of Copenhagen all over again because many people here will know the United Nations is meeting again in Europe for the first time since Copenhagen – this time in Paris. There is a lot of interest around the world in these up and coming meetings. Al Gore is very visible again, and I support him very strongly, I think he’s played a really essential role in all of this. But there he is again – he’s planning events across the world which supposedly will involve a billion people – a range of kind of concerts and other global events that will supposedly pull about a billion people on the streets to put pressure on those meeting in Paris this time to reach some substantive agreements. Well, will such agreements be reached? What are the chances in Paris, 2015, of doing what we couldn’t do in Copenhagen 7 or 8 years ago? Well they could be a bit different because everybody has got the example of Copenhagen in their minds, and so they’re not going to want to repeat that. The European Union is going to be conscious of its lack of influence last time, it’s not going to want to repeat that. Over the period of the last 7 years something very significant has happened, that is the Chinese leadership which in Copenhagen times was very sceptical about the need to do much about climate change, has more or less completely changed its position – sees climate change as inherently dangerous now, and sees it as related to the high levels of orthodox pollution, of ordinary air pollution, in China which is such a huge issue there. So the motivation to reach agreements is probably quite high. However I have to say I suppose that I am sceptical of whether Paris is going to deliver much more than Copenhagen ever did. Because if there are agreements that are reached ... and there could be .. there really is no way of making them binding. They’re supposed to be binding agreements, but there is no mechanism, for making them binding. The United Nations is a relatively weak organisation, it has no legislative power, there is no effective framework of international law. So the chance of Paris making a significant difference I feel anyway is relatively limited, but I hope I’m wrong, but I think it’s relatively limited. I don’t think it will be the fiasco which Copenhagen was, and it may provide some kind of overall framework. But you know what Paris 2015 is? – it’s the 21st meeting of the United Nations framework for climate change – 21 years in which very little has been achieved. That is a long time to be debating the need to take action – 21 years. So it would be quite surprising if they suddenly radically came up with some dramatic solutions.

This suggests to me ... and this is the concluding part of what I want to say ... that we must look for a new paradigm today. We must look for a new set of approaches. On the presumption ... and it’s certainly my firm belief ... that climate change at its outer edges is a threat to the continuity of our civilisation across the world - for reasons that I haven’t mentioned probably so far, but I will shortly. There are quite a few elements that I would want to put in a new paradigm, a new kind of approach, but I’ll just briefly mention four of them and then shut up and give the audience a chance to contribute. First, and I feel this very strongly, I’ve only recently come to see how important this is ... we have to recognise that climate change is a here and now issue. In my book, and I think in most discussions of climate change, the risks that are associated with it are seen as some way down the line – people talk about what’s going to happen in 2030, 2040, 2050 ... but that has very little traction with public opinion because it seems too remote. And also I’ve come to see that at least I think it’s wrong - the true level of risk posed by to me the undeniable shifts in global climate brought about by human intervention, the true level of risk is much higher than it appears if you just deal with climate change on its own. I think I made that mistake before and I don’t want to make it any longer. The reason why climate change is a here and now issue is that it overlaps with a cluster of other risks which we face in global society ... and those risk are like a multiplier. The risks include world population growth - if you think of climate change as something kind of unique in human history, humanly induced climate change, which it is, so is global population. In 1850 there were less than 1 billion people in the world. Now there are over 7 billion people and we’re heading for a world of 10 billion people. The risks associated with that are huge because the world has never had to accommodate anything like that number of people. That risk overlaps with the risk produced by climate change. The same is true of water scarcity and food scarcity, influenced by climate change but also having independent sources too coming from the overuse of water in some areas, the inability of other areas to feed the populations. And both overlap with war, with the return of war on a global level. Not always of course associated with such factors, but in some cases it quite definitely is I think. So I think we’re actually dealing with a cluster of new style risks, and when you put them together these are real here and now risks for us. If anyone here hasn’t seen it and you do get interested in these issues, I hope you’ll watch the American television series called ‘The Years of Living Dangerously’ – ‘The Years of Living Dangerously’. It starts from the civil war in Syria which as we know – horrendous civil war, in which over 3 million people have been displaced, in which 200,000 people have been killed. And the programme tries to show that drought influenced by climate change is one of the causative elements that helped produce that conflict. And I think you see this cluster of factors emerging in quite a few different parts of the world. It elevates the level of risk, it elevates the risk scenario ... it means that it is much more of a here and now risk for us than we used to imagine ... and these risks I think are all too real unfortunately. Second, in my rethinking of the politics of climate change, I think that no matter what happens in Paris 2015 that bilateral and regional agreements are likely probably to be more important than any universal agreements reached in Paris. That is for several reasons. One is, as I mentioned, the UN is weak, the world is essentially run by great power blocks today – by the large countries and by groupings of large countries. Therefore what happens and what the United States does, what China does and what India does to some extent what the European Union does will determine the fate of the world. In fact, unfortunately (?35:36) or otherwise if you look at it, any one of those especially large developing countries, specially China and India – what they do could determine the future of our global climate and therefore our worldwide civilisation because the numbers of people involved are so huge as they go through industrialisation processes. Therefore the more bilateral agreements we can get between the large actors on the global scene, the more we’re dealing with real power rather than just notional and relatively empty agreements that the United Nations might form ... and there is quite a long way to go. I think that Paris could provide a mechanism for the large states getting together, but the crucial one at the moment is probably India. China seems to be now collaborating with the United States, recognising the risks of climate change, recognising its overlap with their own massive problems of pollution. India is still pushing to expand its coal production. Coal is the most lethal form of greenhouse gas. If India cannot be persuaded to join together with the other large power actors on the global scene, the whole game could in fact be lost. But there a lot of it is to play for in these bilateral agreements, and they could make a powerful impact. I’m afraid you’re back in a way to Al Gore and George Bush because politics in the US especially is polarised around climate change, many Republicans deny the reality of climate change. President Obama has been negotiating with China and India, but if he’s supplanted by a Republican president then the whole nature of the game might change. So a good deal would depend, whatever happens elsewhere, on what happens in American domestic politics. That’s how fragile the connection is really between global politics and this imminent global threat which we all I think face. Third, I think in this time we must challenge the power of the fossil fuel companies and we must do so on a global level. The fossil fuel companies have brought massive economic development, progress to many parts of the world, but they are the main source of the emissions which are created ... or one of the main sources, creating radical climate change. So far renewable forms of energy have made very little impact on the spread of fossil fuels. You’re talking about coal, oil and gas around the world. And for a long while it seemed to many people, and indeed it seemed to me in 2007-8 that the global role of the fossil fuel companies was implacable, they’re so powerful, they have such inertia built into their existing investments that it might be impossible to reverse their impact on the world scene. I no longer think this is true. Two reasons why I’ve changed my opinion. One is that this is the period I think ... even the last 10 years, the biggest most radical forms of technological change the world has ever experienced, led by digital technology. We have the chance of changing established structures ... indeed they have been changed in many areas much more quickly and much more globally than ever before. If I can give you an example of what I mean – when the first telephone was invented in the 19th century it took 75 years before there were 50 million users. The iPhone was only invented in 2007, there are now 2.5 billion iPhone users in the world, and many others have smartphones. This is the first time in human history that the most advanced technologies have also gone directly to the poorer countries. So Africa, many African countries, have been able to skip a whole period in the development of fixed telephone lines and go straight to mobile phone systems. I now think for the first time the same might be possible of renewable technologies - that because of the advance of digitalisation it might be possible for large swathes of Africa and other developing countries to go directly to renewables on a large scale, and to do this very quickly, and to do so in a way which might show that the apparent inertia of the fossil fuel companies is not nearly as real as it appeared even a few years ago, because of the massive advances in technology that are being made. There is a further factor, that is you can add to this a global disinvestment campaign ... fossil fuel companies are on the portfolios of many pension funds, there is a lot of stakeholder activism around the world trying to ensure that these funds also invest in renewable technologies. So I think a kind of technological leap forward of a kind that’s never been seen before might be possible, that could actively change the very structure of the way in which countries fuel their economic development - there is a great source of hope I think in that. Finally, fourthly, because of this background partly, because of the shifts going on in a global society, I think local activism can have an immediate global impact in a way that was never possible before. Even like 15 or so years ago, never possible before, because of the transformational advances in world society produced by digital technology. If I just give you like an analogy based on what I said a bit earlier ... say you’re ... I was talking to someone at the back there from China, you’re living in the UK – you can now talk to your family back home every day - you can see them on your mobile device and they can see you – and you can do it for nothing. No one would have thought that remotely possible probably even 15 years ago. To me it transforms the nature of what immigration and mobility means.

Well the same thing could happen in terms of the relationship between local and regional activism and the wider global society and the imperatives of climate change. Just to take a couple of examples before I conclude ... therefore rather than just nations leading the attempt to curb climate change, cities might have a more significant role than nations will ... except for perhaps the large nations I just mentioned. Because cities can organise themselves dynamically, they can collaborate across the world, and they can collaborate in real time – you can share knowledge in an immediate way such as you never could before. And there are various groups of cities such as the C40 Cities Leadership Group, which have got together to try and act as a vanguard for transformation, climate change. The background to this is that cities produce a great deal of global emissions and they do so especially in the poorer countries ... and in this area there are actually quite amazing changes happening. I don’t have time to talk about them in detail, but I’ll give you the example of Mexico City. Mexico City is one of the most polluted cities in the world – a very large city. It’s had a whole range of initiatives to try to both reduce local pollution and reduce emissions. They have been amazingly successful over a pretty short period. What can be done in Mexico City can be done in many other cities across the world. And local activist groups, because they can network in an immediate way as a result of the digital revolution can have much more global impact, and that global impact can reverberate back on local places. So I think there are really major sets of changes afoot here which could provide a transformative vehicle that’s lacking probably in the orthodox United Nations agreements to try to make a real impact on reducing emissions across the world.

For anyone interested in China and the connection between greenhouse gases and local pollution, you should look at this set of programmes on the internet ... I don’t know if you know the history of it .. it’s produced by a very young director journalist called ... forgive my pronunciation – Chai Jing ... its called ‘Under the Dome’, and it’s an amazing documentation of the consequences for health and other aspects of life of the massive pollution in Chinese cities. It was banned by the Chinese government after a couple of weeks, but has since become like a viral thing on the global internet. It’s well worth looking at because it shows the motive power to control local pollution, especially within cities, can be a medium of controlling the greenhouse gases which are producing climate change. And I found it a both disturbing and moving enterprise well worth having a look at.

Well you know I usually try and tell a few jokes to relieve the gloom – there aren’t many good climate change jokes unfortunately, so I’m going to finish by telling a football joke. Probably most people here come from China, so you might not get it but anyway ... this referee dies right, and goes to heaven, and when he gets to the pearly gates St Peter says to him ‘Well you can’t come in unless you’ve done something particularly moral or particularly brave’. And he says ‘Well I’m a referee, I haven’t done anything moral, but I did do something which was pretty brave. I was refereeing a match between Everton and Liverpool at Anfield and I gave a penalty against Liverpool in the last 40 seconds of the match, from which Everton scored and won the match’. And St Peter said ‘God that was really brave, how long ago was that?’ And he says ‘5 minutes’. (laughter) Well you know 5 minutes is about what we’ve got in historical time, a relatively short period of time, to try to curb dramatic transformations, which I want to insist again overlap with one another in creating a pretty dangerous environment, not just for our remote future, but for our immediate future, and that’s why we need a resurgent effort, information among the public, to seek to deal with this threat. Thank you very much for your attendance and listening.

(applause)